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THE BATTLE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT:
A STUDY IN JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION
MAXWELL BRANDWEN*
During the past decade, the United States Supreme Court has
been called upon to deal extensively with problems involving free
speech' and silence.2 This article will deal with certain aspects of
the free-speech clause of the first amendment. Few issues have in-
spired such deep judicial controversy and division during the present
century as has the interpretation of that clause.3 Once historical
evidence, indispensable to a study of the free-speech clause, is evalu-
ated, the criteria necessary for the interpretation of the first amend-
ment should become clear.
Speaking for the majority of the Supreme Court in Roth v.
United States,4 Justice Brennan said:
The protection given speech and press was fashioned to
assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about
of political and social changes desired by the people.... All
ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importance
-unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas hateful
to the prevailing climate of opinion-have the full protection
of the guaranties, unless excludable because they encroach
upon the limited area of more important interests.5
* Member of the New York Bar.
Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959); Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp.
v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684 (1959); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476(1957); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957); Butler v. Michigan,
352 U.S. 380 (1957); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Feiner
v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951).
' Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957); Watkins v. United
States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
'See FRANKFURTER, OF LAW AND MEN 35 (1956).
'354 U.S. 476 (1957).
'Id. at 484. (Emphasis added.) Referring to the use of this statement,
Justice Harlan said: it "appears to me to beg the very question before
us." Id. at 497. A thought somewhat similar to that of Justice Brennan
is found in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942), in
which the Court stated: "It has been well observed that such utterances are
no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social
value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is
clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality."
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In Dennis v. United States,' a purality of the Court said:
Speech is not an absolute, above and beyond control by the
legislature when its judgment, subject to review here, is that
certain kinds of speech are so undesirable as to warrant
criminal sanction. Nothing is more certain in modern society
than the principle that there are no absolutes, that a name, a
phrase, a standard has meaning only when associated with the
considerations which gave birth to the nomenclature."
Justice Frankfurter summarized the foregoing concept in the
following pithy terms: "Free speech is subject to prohibition of those
abuses of expression which a civilized society may forbid.",,
Justice Black, however, has rejected social value as an indis-
pensable condition for constitutionally protected speech. Moreover,
the opinion that even socially useful speech is subordinate to "more
important interests" was repugnant to him. He expressed his con-
stitutional position in the following explicit terms:
[The First] Amendment provides, in simple words, that
"Congress shall make no law . . .abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press." I read "no law . . .abridging" to
mean no law abridging. The First Amendment, which is the
supreme law of the land, has thus fixed its own value on free-
dom of speech and press by putting these freedoms wholly
"beyond the reach" of federal power to abridge. No other
provision of the Constitution purports to dilute the scope of
these unequivocal commands of the First Amendment. Conse-
quently, I do not believe that any federal agencies, including
Congress and this Court, have power or authority to sub-
ordinate speech and press to what they think are "more im-
portant interests." The contrary notion is, in my judgment,
court-made not Constitution-made.
These are not the only differences of opinion in the Court.
Justices Jackson and Harlan sharply differentiated the scope of the
-341 U.S. 494 (1951).
'Id. at 508 (Opinion of Vinson, C.J.).8Id. at 523 (concurring opinion).
' Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 157-59 (1959) (concurring opinion).
(Emphasis is in original.)
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state power from that of federal regulatory power over free speech.10
For them, state power to regulate speech was broader because the
applicable constitutional standards were less stringent.
The issue which has generated such division is one of the most
fundamental, delicate and perplexing to come before the Court-the
conflict between the interests of the individual and those of society.
The liberty protected by the free-speech clause, like other constitu-
tionally protected liberties, is subject to abuses of excess and depriva-
tion. Legislators, state and federal, are understandably concerned
with limiting abuses by the individual. Individuals are eager to
preserve the liberties which they cherish as the bases of our demo-
cratic form of government.
Several questions come to mind. Is this conflict to be determined
by negotiation between society and the individual? If there is to be
such negotiation, what is the appropriate forum-the halls of Con-
gress or judicial chambers? What are the limiting constitutional
restrictions underlying such determination? These are complex and
challenging questions, the answer to which first requires an examina-
tion of the scope and meaning of the free-speech clause of the first
amendment.
The first amendment became a part of the Constitution of the
United States on December 5, 1791." The guarantee of freedom
of speech and press against violation by the new national govern-
ment was a condition of the ratification of the Constitution by
Virginia, New York and North Carolina. 2
The amendment states that "Congress shall make no law . . .
abridging the freedom of speech or of the press."' These are com-
mon words in the common speech of men. 4 The first fact to note
"o Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 503 (1957) (Harlan, J., dissent-
ing); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 288-95 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting).
"1 Only ten of the thirteen states had ratified the Bill of Rights at that
time. Massachusetts, Connecticut and Georgia did not ratify the Bill of
Rights until 1939, the Sesquicentennial Anniversary of the Constitution.
Those states were satisfied with the Constitution as it was, unamended.
" Virginia recommended that in the proposed bill of rights liberty of the
press should be protected as "one of the greatest bulwarks of liberty" and in
ratifying the Consitution declared that liberty of the press cannot "be cancelled
abridged restrained or modified by any authority of the United States." H.R.
Doc. No. 398, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 1027 (1927).
"
3 U.S. CoNsT. amend I. Madison and Wilson said they meant the pro-
hibition to apply not only to Congress but to the general government.
" Even the term "abridging" presents no complicated repertory of
meaning. "Abridge" is a term known in our language since the four-
1962]
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is that the command of the first amendment runs against legislative
action by Congress. The mandate is specific and unequivocal. The
prohibition is unconditional. Still its plain language was insufficient
to preclude sharpe conflicts in judicial interpretation.
Clearly, there is no rule of thumb or mathematical table which
judges may consult in interpreting a constitutional or legislative
enactment. Instead, many canons and maxims of interpretation have
evolved to meet the evergrowing complexities of the problem. Justice
Frankfurter, in the course of a learned essay on "the reading of
statutes," made the following trenchant comments:
A judge must not rewrite a statute, neither to enlarge nor to
contract it. Whatever temptations the statesmanship of policy-
making might wisely suggest, construction must eschew in-
terpolation and evisceration. He must not read in by way of
creation. He must not read out except to avoid patent non-
sense or internal contradiction.' 5
What applies to a statute should apply with at least as much
force to the Constitution of the United States. "Interpolation" and
"evisceration" are no less objectionable when applied to a consti-
tution. To read the free-speech clause as it is written and to recog-
nize it as a categorical, unqualified limitation on Congress result
neither in "utter nonsense" nor in "internal contradiction." Judge
Learned Hand, however, would "read in by way of creation" if it
were necessary to achieve the objectives of the undertaking."0 This
teenth century. OxFoRD ENGLIsH DICTIONARY (1933), defines it as follows:
"To curtail, to lessen, to diminish (rights, privileges, advantages, or author-
ity). . . ." The term "abridge" was not commonly employed in the free-
speech-press clauses. The term "restrain" was generally preferred. For
example, the Massachusetts constitution of 1780 provided that "the liberty
of the press is essential to the security of freedom in a state; it ought not,
therefore, to be restrained in this Commonwealth." See also the free-speech
clause in the Pennsylvania constitution of 1776. Perhaps the framers selected
the term "abridge" because it was contained in Virginia's draft of a proposed
bill of rights. The term "abridge" is hardly a milder term than "restrain."
Madison's original draft used the phrase: "The people shall not be deprived
or abridged of their right to speak, to write, or to publish their sentiments."
1 ANNALS OF CONG. 434 (1834) [1789-1824].
15 FRANKFURTER, op. cit. supra note 3, at 53.
"For centuries it has been an accepted canon in interpretation of docu-
ments to interpolate into the text such provisions, though not expressed, as
are essential to prevent the defeat -of the venture at hand; and this applies
with especial force to the interpretation of constitutions, which . . . must be
cast in general language .... " HAND, THE BIu OF RIGHTS 14 (1958); see
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is the rationale of his support of Chief Justice Marshall's decision in
Marbury v. Madison.' 7
Although no express grant of power was given to the Supreme
Court of the United States to invalidate an act of Congress, the
Supreme Court assumed such power. There was nothing in the
Constitution which endowed the courts with any authority even to,
review the decisions of Congress. Chief Justice Marshall's act of
assumption appeared essential if the young American government
was not to collapse."8
When the majority of the Court made social utility, however
slight, an indispensable requisite for constitutional protection of free,
speech, or when it subordinated speech to "more important inter-
ests," it imported qualifications into the first amendment. An in-
teresting question suggests itself at this point. Would Judge Learned,
Hand have said "it was not a lawless act to import into the Consti-.
tion such a grant of power" had there been an express unconditional
prohibition in the Constitution itself, forbidding the court to invali-
date an act of Congress?"9 It seems doubtful that even as hardy-
also id. at 29. He spoke of interpretation as "the proliferation of purpose."
Id. at 24.
175 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-80 (1803).
's See HAND, op. cit. supra note 16, at 29, where Judge Hand said: "It
was not a lawless act to import into the Constitution such a grant of power
On the contrary, in construing written documents it has always been thought-
proper to engraft upon the text such provisions as are necessary to prevent
the failure of the undertaking. That is no doubt a dangerous liberty, not-
lightly to be resorted to.. . ." At another point, Judge Hand said that we
must infer that power "although it is nowhere expressed, for without it we-
should have to refer all disputes between the 'Departments' and states to
popular decision, patently an impractical means of relief, whatever Thomas.
Jefferson may have thought." Id. at 66.
Another example of "engrafting" is found in the privilege against com-
pulsory self-incrimination. The privilege of the fifth amendment is stated
to apply "in any criminal case." Yet courts long ago determined that the
effective realization of the privilege demanded a broad application and an
extension beyond criminal cases. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616.
1886) (protection extended to civil forfeiture); see also GRIswOLD, THE-
TH AMENDMENT TODAY 55 (1955).
" This hypothetical question is not so far-fetched as it might seem at first:
blush. There was a considerable body of opinion in the ConstitutionalD
Convention against the exercise of such power by the Court. See HAND,
op. cit. supra note 16, at 28. See also Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the-
American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893).
Judge Hand said that the second clause of Article VI of the United States.
Constitution-the so-called "supremacy clause," which provides for a "limited'jurisdiction [in the state courts over federal constitutional questions], looks
rather against than in favor of a general jurisdiction" in the courts. HAND,
op. cit. supra note 16, at 28. On the other hand, Justice Gibson of the,
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and majestic a soul as Chief Justice Marshall would have im-
ported such a grant of power in the face of an express prohibition.
Interpolation, when there is a vacuum, essential to effectuate the
basic objectives of the Constitution and to avoid chaos is a far cry
from flouting a specific constitutional prohibition. Fear of possible
chaos should not be a sufficient justification in law to disregard an
express prohibition against the exercise of such power. When Chief
Justice Marshall proclaimed that it was a Constitution that the Court
was expounding, he did not forget that the Court had to take the
Constitution as it found it. And the Constitution, as the Court finds
it, contains an express unconditional prohibition against Congress
enacting any law abridging the freedom of speech.
At this point, Justice Cardozo may be invited in with his
characteristically illuminating observations. He said: "[T]he mean-
ing of a statute is to be looked for, not in any single section, but in
all the parts together and in their relation to the end in view."20
And on another occasion, he said: "There is need to keep in view
also the structure of the statute, and the relation, physical and logical,
between its several parts."2'
The first amendment, as we know, was one of many enacted
at the same time, conferring privileges and immunities on indi-
viduals. Some amendments are couched in terms of unconditional
prohibition. Others prohibit only unreasonable invasion or exces-
sive burdens. Although egalitarian ideals inspired the statement
"that all men are created equal," such egalitarianism was not spread
evenly among the privileges and immunities created by the Bill of
Rights.22 For example, "searches and seizures" were expressly pro-
hibited, only if they were "unreasonable." Bail or fines could not
lawfully be excessive. No such qualifications were placed on free-
dom of speech.
It is important to mark these differences adopted by the framers
of these amendments. It would dishonor the founders to ignore
Pennsylvania court found such power in the clause that the Constitution and
the laws and treaties made in pursuance thereof "shall be the supreme law
of the land." See Thayer, supra at 129-30.2" Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 439 (1935) (dissent).
2 Duparquet Hout & Moneuse Co. v. Evans, 297 U.S. 216, 218 (1936)
(interpreting the Bankruptcy Act). These canons are not unlike that pro-
posed by Justice Holmes. Emphasis should be placed, he felt, on the
language in the totality of enactment. FRANKFURTER, op. cit. supra note 3,
at 51.2 See FREUND, ON UNDERSTANDING THE SUPREmE COURT 22 (1949).
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those differences or to suggest that those distinctions were meaning-
less or were the result of arbitrary, hasty or casual draftsmenship 3
Even allowing for the imprecision of language and the impossibility
of adequately expressing thoughts in verbal symbols, the founders
must be credited with the capacity for adequately expressing the
difference between a categorical and a qualified prohibition. 4
How the Court has viewed various constitutional privileges may
be helpful in this analysis. In dealing with the privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination-a "passive" liberty endowed with un-
qualified constitutional protection-the Court has uniformly safe-
guarded it without exception. Indeed, the Court has gone farther.
No witness is required to state the ground on which he believes his
answer might be self-incriminating, unless palpably frivolous, since
that disclosure might expose him to the risk of incriminating him-
self. 5 The privilege is available to him, in the event that a truthful
answer might furnish a link in the chain of evidence required to
prosecute him. 6 The Court has, in a dictum, recognized this priv-
ilege in legislative proceedings.
By broadly construing this privilege,2" and denying this interpre-
A distinguished scholar has said: "In the glorious act of reverting from
a state of nature to a civil government by framing a social compact, Ameri-
cans tended simply to draw up a glittering catalogue of 'rights' that satisfied
their urge for an expression of first principles. It was a terribly important
and serious task, but was executed in an incredibly haphazard fashion that
verged on ineptness." LEVY, LEGACY OF SuPPREssIoN 281 (1960). But
there was little that was "haphazard" or "inept" in the fashion in which the
Bill of Rights was framed. To the framers, the Bill of Rights was not "a
glittering catalogue of 'rights'." Professor Levy's recent work is invaluable
for its wealth of historical material dealing with free speech.
2"[T]he need for [judicial] interpretation is usually in inverse ratio to
the care and imagination of draftsmen." FRANKFUmER, op. cit. supra note 3,
at 46.
" In United States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. 38 (No. 14692e) (C.C.D. Va.
1807), is found Chief Justice Marshall's historic pronouncement as to
the duty 'of a court to accept a witness' statement that an answer may in-
criminate him, unless the court decides that a direct answer cannot implicate
the witness. See also Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951).
Cf. Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 374 (1951).
"' Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 159 (1950).
"
7Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
" "A good many efforts have been made to rationalize the privilege, to
explain why it is a desirable or essential part of our basic law. None of the
explanations is wholly satisfactory." GRIsWoLn, op. cit. supra note 18, at 7.
The existence of exceptions has been denied in Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S.
591, 597 (1896). Even though the Court has validated immunity statutes, it
has done so only after seeking to assure the fullest protection to the indi-
vidual against compulsory self-incrimination. Ullmann v. United States, 350
U.S. 422 (1956).
1962]
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tation to the first amendment, the Court has in fact set up a double
standard of construction. This does not seem justified. The pro-
tection of this privilege is no more explicit or categorical than is
that of the first amendment. The privilege against compulsory
self-incrimination poses no fewer difficulties in reconciling and ad-
justing different constitutional principles "each of which would be
entitled to possession of the disputed ground but for the presence of
the others .. .*"' The danger of self-incrimination is no less
difficult to fix and determine than the abridgement of free speech.
It may be urged in support of the unconditional observance of
the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination that society can
protect itself against the spread of crime by other means. If the
prosecuting officers are sufficiently zealous, it is suggested, they can
discover the guilty criminal without having to depend upon the in-
dividual's self-incriminating testimony. Perhaps that is generally
the case; but would a different construction of the privilege follow
if it could be convincingly shown in a particular case that such self-
incriminating evidence was necessary to solve the crime? Quite
obviously not. Neither is it an answer to say that the privilege may
be preserved by a fully protective immunity statute, whereas no such
relief is available to the legislative branch with respect to free
speech.
Perhaps those who would adopt a literal interpretation of the
privilege against self-incrimination, and yet would deny it to free-
speech, justify the double standard on the ground that silence creates
less danger to society than does speech. But the preservation of
silence should rate no higher judicial sanction than the exercise of
free speech. 3  Silence is no more conducive to good representative
government and a healthy democratic society than free-speech.31
It may also be urged that the privilege against compulsory self-
incrimination has been deeply imbedded in the common law since
the middle of the seventeenth century, whereas the concept of free-
"'Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 357 (1908)
(Holmes, J.).
" See opinion of Justice Frankfurter in Ullmann v. United States, 350
U.S. 422, 426-27 (1956); see also dissenting opinion of Justice Shiras in
Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 628 (1896).
"i "The First Amendment, its prohibition in terms absolute, was designed
to preclude courts as well as legislatures from weighing the values of speech
against silence." Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 514 (1957) (Doug-
las, J., dissenting).
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speech was a controversial issue up to the time of the enactment of
the first amendment, and even to this date.
Here again, we may be enlightened by Justice Cardozo's genius.
He said:
[T]he privilege against compulsory self-incrimination might
be lost, and justice still done. Indeed, today as in the past
there are students of our penal system who look upon the im-
munity as a mischief rather than a benefit, and who would
limit its scope or destroy it altogether .... Justice, however,
would not perish if the accused were subject to a duty to re-
spond to orderly inquiry."
Contrast the above with the Justice's comments on the privilege
of free speech:
We reach a different plane of social and moral values
when we pass to the privileges and immunities that have been
taken over from the earlier articles of the federal bill of rights
and brought within the Fourteenth Amendment by a process
of absorption. These in their origin were effective against
the federal government alone. If the Fourteenth Amend-
ment has absorbed them, the process of absorption has had
its source in the belief that neither liberty nor justice would
exist if they were sacrificed .... This is true, for illustra-
tion, of freedom of thought, and speech. Of that freedom
one may say that it is the matrix, the indispensable condi-
tion, of nearly every other form of freedom. 3
" Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937). It is interesting
.to note that Bentham, who was one of the most advanced libertarians in the
realm of free speech, believed that there was no rational justification for
the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination and that it was a positive
.mischief and an obstacle to justice. 5 BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL
EVIDENcE 523-40 (1827). Judge Knox has suggested that Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), the leading case interpreting the privilege
against compulsory self-incrimination, "should be relegated to the junk pile."
Address by John C. Knox, in 7 AssociATIoN OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF
NEW YORK, LEcuREs oN LEGAL Topics 54 (1929). It is also worth noting
that at least nine of the original states had constitutional provisions guaran-
teeing liberty of the press, whereas only a smaller number-five-provided
-protection against compulsory self-incrimination. A somewhat different view
was expressed by the majority of the Court, when it said: "Time has not
-shown that protection from the evils against which this safeguard was di-
rected is needless or unwarranted." Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S.
422, 426 (1956).
" Palko v. Connecticut, supra note 32, at 326-27.
1962]
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It is true that Justice Cardozo did not define the concept of
free speech; neither did he define the privilege against compulsory
self-incrimination. If the latter privilege is entitled to the fullest
observance, then why not the privilege of free speech-"the in-
dispensable condition of nearly every other form of freedom" ?84
Thus far, we have dealt with general canons of interpretation
formulated by distinguished jurists. Now let us turn to a test
directed specifically to the free-speech clause by Justice Frank-
furter, one of the most articulate spokesmen of the majority view
of the Court on this issue and from whose gifted pen have flowed
some of the most glowing passages in defense of individual lib-
erties. 5 He made the following observations: "The language of
the First Amendment is to be read not as barren words found in a
dictionary but as symbols of historic experience illumined by the
presuppositions of those who employed them."3 From this prelude,
he proceeded to the following question: "Not what words did Madi-
son and Hamilton use, but what was it in their minds which they
conveyed."T
", Whether or not we like the term "preferred rights" as applied to free
speech, it is indisputable that the Court has on occasion accepted a distinction
between various rights, privileges and immunities. To illustrate: "The right
of a State to regulate, for example, a public utility may well include, so far
as the due process test is concerned, power to impose all of the restrictions
which a legislature may have a 'rational basis' for adopting. But freedom of
speech and of press, of assembly, and of worship may not be infringed on
such slender grounds. They are susceptible of restriction only to prevent
grave and immediate danger to interests which the State may lawfully pro-
tect." West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639(1943). Perhaps that may be the Court's way of expressing a double stand-
ard on philosophic grounds.
.'Despite his opposition to what he terms the "absolutist" construction
of the free speech clause of the first amendment, Justice Frankfurter de-
livered one of the most eloquent utterances in support of free speech:
"[T]he liberty of man to search for truth ought not to be fettered, no matter
what orthodoxies he may challenge. Liberty of thought soon shrivels without
freedom of expression. Nor can truth be pursued in an atmosphere hostile
to the endeavor or under dangers which are hazarded only by heroes." Den-
nis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 550 (1951) (concurring opinion).
*'Id. at 523.
Ibid. (Emphasis added.) See also FRANKFURTER, op. cit. supra note 3,
at 48, wherein it is said: "[T]he troublesome phase of construction is the
determination of the extent to which extraneous documentation and external
circumstances may be allowed to infiltrate the text on the theory that they
were part of it... ." The question posed by the eminent Justice is somewhat
surprising when one recalls what he said on another occasion about mental
exploration or sorties: "We are not concerned with anything subjective. We
do not delve into the minds of legislators or their draftsmen, or committee
members." Id. at 61.
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Let us assume for the moment, however, that the inquiry is
directed to ascertaining the content of the concept of free speech as
it was understood by the framers in 1789 when the first amendment
was drafted. Analysis will be facilitated if we divide the inquiry
into three distinct points of time: (1) when the Constitution was
ratified; (2) when the first amendment and Bill of Rights were
framed; (3) early post-amendment thinking and interpretation.
When the ratification of the Constitution was under discussion,
the most important single objection to ratification of the Consti-
tution was the absence of a bill of rights. In reply to this objection,
the framers, particularly Madison and Hamilton, repeatedly assured
the people that even without an express prohibition such as that
later imposed by the first amendment, Congress and the federal gov-
ernment were without authority to restrict freedom of speech or
press in any manner. 8 Under the federal system created by the
Constitution, the national government could exercise only such
powers as were specifically enumerated or were necessary and proper
for their effectuation.
James Wilson of Pennsylvania, one of the two or three most
influential framers of the Constitution as well as one of the outstand-
ing legal luminaries of the period, was in general agreement with
Madison and Hamilton as to the lack of power in Congress to re-
strict freedom of speech in any manner. At the Pennsylvania rati-
fying convention of 1787, opponents of ratification had asserted
that the failure to guarantee freedom of the press meant that oppres-
sion of opinion was constitutionally possible. Wilson replied that
"there is given to the general government no power whatsoever con-
cerning it [liberty of the press]; and no law in pursuance of the
Constitution can possibly be enacted, to destroy that liberty.""9
Although much of the pressure for a bill of rights was sincerely
motivated, some was but a smoke screen or a dilatory maneuver.
"Hamilton made this point clearly in THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 11
(Cooke ed. 1961) (Hamilton), wherein he said: "For why declare that things
shall not be done which there is no power to do? Why, for instance, should
it be said that the liberty of the press shall not be restrained when no power
is given by which restrictions may be imposed." Madison "regarded a decla-
ration of rights as unnecessary and dangerous-unnecessary because the gen-
eral government had no power but what was given to it, dangerous because an
incomplete enumeration was unsafe." BRANT, JAMES MADISON: FATHER or
THE CONSTITUTION 226 (1950).
" PENNSYLVANIA AND THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 1787-1788, at 308
(McMaster & Stone 1888). See also H.R. Doc. No. 398, 69th Cong., 1st
Sess. 726 (1927).
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Many of the anti-Federalists were more interested in strengthening
the states at the expense of the national government than in amend-
ments designed to safeguard personal liberties." They were more
interested in maintaining greater states' power in the fields of taxa-
tion, judiciary, commerce, treaty power, navigation laws and the
like. They used the absence of a bill of rights as a convenient
and dramatic excuse for opposing the adoption of the Constitution.
Madison and other leading Federalists, in a desire to allay popu-
lar fears, reluctantly pledged themselves to frame amendments
guaranteeing individual rights as soon as the new government began
to function. True to his pledge, Madison drafted the Bill of Rights
for the first Congress. It is well to pause for a moment and note
the precise words of the preamble to the resolution offering the Bill
of Rights, wherein Congress said:
The Conventions of a number of the States having .
expressed a desire, in order to prevent misconstruction or
abuse of its power, that further declaratory and restrictive
clauses should be added, and as extending the ground of
public confidence in the Government ....
Since the framers said that the national government had no
power whatsoever over speech, certainly "declaratory and restrictive
clauses" may not be construed as conferring on the government a
power which did not exist before the amendment was adopted. 2
The sparse congressional debates on the amendment, like those
in the states over the ratification of the Constitution without a bill
of rights, were far from clear and precise. None the less, in the
course of the debates in Congress, Madison said: "[T] he right of
freedom of speech is secured; the liberty of press is expressly de-
clared to be beyond the reach of this Government ....
Although this statement does not precisely define the scope and
meaning of the free-speech-and-press clause of the first amendment,
See LEvy, op. cit. supra note 23, at 250.
416 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 391 (Hunt ed. 1906). (Emphasis
added.)
'" Letter From James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, October 17, 1788,
in 5 id. at 271. See also 5 id. at 391, where Madison stated: "[N]o power
whatever over the press was supposed to be delegated by the Constitution, as
it originally stood, and that the Amendment was intended as a positive and
absolute reservation of it."
' 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 738 (1834) [1789-1824]. See also Justice Black's
concurring opinion in Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 155-59 n.2 (1959).
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it is not without some value in ascertaining Madison's thoughts. 44
Moreover, something which Madison urged upon Congress sheds
considerable light on his thinking at the time. Although no state
demanded this, Madison also proposed an amendment guaranteeing
the "equal rights of conscience" and freedom of the press against
state violation. He conceived such amendment to be the most
important in the whole list.4 ' The House passed the amendment,46
but the Senate, influenced by a strong state sovereignty sentiment,
rejected it. Consequently, the restriction was confined to Congress.
The states were left in full possession of their restrictive powers
respecting speech and press, subject only to such restraints as were
imposed by their own constitutions.
This distinction between the prohibition on Congress and ab-
sence of restraint on the states was definitely recognized. Jefferson
" "It is not even certain that the Framers themselves knew what they
had in mind .... [F]ew among them if any at all clearly understood what
they meant by the free speech-and-press clause, and it is perhaps doubtful
that those few agreed except in a generalized way and equally doubtful that
they represented a consensus." LEvy, op. cit. su1pra note 23, at 236. See
also Chafee, Book Review, 62 H.A v. L. REv. 891, 898 (1949), where Pro-
fessor Chafee said: "The truth is, I think, that the framers had no very
clear idea as to what they meant by 'the freedom of speech or of the press'."
The foregoing statements merit considerable reservation. The framers were
certain that even in the absence of a bill of rights, the national government
was bereft of any power or authority to restrict speech or the press. See
LEvY, op. cit. supra note 23, at 225. Furthermore, the enactment of a cate-
gorical prohibition did not result in the creation of a power where none
existed before. Professor Levy suggested that since there was no extended
public debate or reasoned analysis of the free-speech-and-press clause, it is
incredible to assume that there was any intent to alter the common law con-
cept of seditious libel. To be sure, a detailed analysis of the amendment
would have been desirable, but is Professor Levy's conclusion fully war-
ranted? First of all, as we have observed, the framers believed that the
national government was without power in this area. So far as the national
government was concerned, there was a vacuum in that field. The amend-
ment simply sought to express that fact. It did not fill the vacuum, nor did
it create a power previously nonexistent. The states were left with their
power over speech and press unimpaired-and that is where the common law
concept of a seditious libel might still remain operative. When Professor
Levy said "not even the Anti-Federalists offered the argument that the clause
on speech and press was unsatisfactory because insufficiently protective," was
he not begging the question? Why assume that the clause was insufficiently
protective? See generally id. at 234-36.
45 Id. at 223.
"' The amendment passed by a select committee of the House included
freedom of speech, an omission in Madison's proposed amendment to the
House. In his amendment regulating the states (No. 5 in his draft), Madi-
son used the phrase "equal rights of conscience." 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 435
(1834) [1789-1824].
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referred to it specifically." Unfortunately, that distinction has not
always been observed by the Court."' By a curious quirk of reason-
"' See Letter From Thomas Jefferson to Abigail Adams, September 11,
1804, quoted by Justice Frankfurter in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S.
494, 522 n.4 (1951) (concurring opinion), wherein Jefferson argued
that the first amendment reflected a limitation upon federal power, leaving
the right to enforce restrictions on speech to the states. This letter, written
seventeen years after the Wilson statement reaffirms the Wilson point of
view.
,. See the opinion of Justice Frankfurter in Dennis v. United States,
supra note 47, at 521, where the eminent Justice apparently overlooked the
distinction between the limitations imposed -on the United States Congress
and the absence of those limitations on the states. Thus to support a his-
torical interpretation of the powers left to Congress under the first amend-
ment, he cites state statutes in existence at the time of its adoption which
can demonstrate only the powers exercised by the states under their own
constitutional mandates. That is quite a different situation from that pre-
sented by the first amendment.
Prior to 1791, Pennsylvania was the only state protecting free speech.
The distinction between state and federal jurisdiction over freedom of speech
is vividly demonstrated by the declaration incorporated in Virginia's con-
stitutional ratification and proposed bill of rights. It declared that "among
other essential rights the liberty of Conscience and of the Press cannot
be cancelled abridged restrained or modified by any authority of the United
States." H.R. Doc. No. 398, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 1027 (1927). But in
dealing with free speech within its own borders, Virginia was not so liberal.
It reserved by statute the right to punish political speech characterized by
dangerous tendencies. After Pennsylvania ratified the first amendment, it
adopted in 1790 a new constitution drafted by James Wilson. It is par-
ticularly interesting to compare the language of the new Pennsylvania consti-
tution with that of the free-speech-and-press clause of the federal constitution.
The former provided: "The free communication of thoughts and opinions is
one of the invaluable rights of man; and every citizen may freely speak,
write, and print on any subject, behig responsible for the abuse of that
liberty." PA. CoNsT. art. 9, § 7 (1790), in H.R. Doc. No. 357, 59th Cong.,
2d Sess. 3100 (1909). (Emphasis added.) Delaware in its 1792 consti-
tution, followed Pennsylvania's language with respect to the responsibility for
abuse of liberty. DEL. CoxsT. art. 1, § 5 (1792), in H.R. Doc. No. 357, 59th
Cong., 2d Sess. 569 (1909). When New York ratified the federal consti-
tution in 1788, it recommended an amendment reciting "that the Freedom of
the Press ought not to be violated or restrained." H.R. Doc. No. 398, 69th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1037 (1927). Yet, the state constitution contained no pro-
vision for the protection of the press. H.R. Doc. No. 357, 59th Cong., 2d
Sess. 2623, 2636-37 (1909). This confusion as to what Congress was for-
bidden to do and what was reserved to the states is apparent in the opinion
of the majority of the Court in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 483
(1957). The Court stated that since practically all the states legislated
against libel, blasphemy and profanity at the time of the ratification of the
first amendment "the unconditional phrasing of the First Amendment was not
intended to protect every utterance." Logic does not compel that con-
clusion. Perhaps the confusion also accounts for the following statement of
Justice Frankfurter in Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952):
"Libelous utterances not being within the area of constitutionally protected
speech, it is unnecessary, either for us or for the State courts, to consider the
issues beyond the phrase 'clear and present danger.'" Cf. Justices Jackson and
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ing, some members of the Court assumed that since the states
were not subject to the restraints of the first amendment, such
freedom was also enjoyed by the federal government. These Justices
have overlooked the fact that the first amendment served to reserve
to the states their former authority over speech and press.
An especially persuasive piece of evidence in support of the
unconditional character of the prohibition in the first amendment is
found in the correspondence between Madison and Jefferson in 1789.
In commenting on Madison's proposed amendments, Jefferson said:
[T] he following alterations would have pleased me ....
"The people shall not be deprived or abridged of their right
to speak or write or otherwise to publish anything but false
facts affecting injuriously the life, liberty, property, or reputa-
tion of others or affecting the peace of the confederacy with
foreign nations."49
In other words, Jefferson sought to carve out certain exceptions
from the broad expanse of free speech. He did not wish to restrict
Congress in dealing with defamation or national security. It does
not require much imagination to realize how much weaker the free
speech clause would have become with Jefferson's exceptions. But
despite the closeness of the relationship between Madison and Jeffer-
son and the towering respect which the former had for the latter,
Jefferson's suggestions were not adopted. Although the precise
reasons for the rejection of Jefferson's views are not given, it is
fair to suggest that the framers adhered to the principle that the
Harlan dissenting in Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 169 (1959) (Harlan,
J., separate opinion); Roth v. United States, suepra at 496 (Harlan, J.);
Beaubarnais v. Illinois, supra at 287 (Jackson, J.). The extent to which
the first amendment was absorbed within the fourteenth amendment requires
detailed treatment which cannot be done without unduly enlarging the length
of this study.
4" 15 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 367 (Boyd ed. 1950). (Em-
phasis is in original.) The notion that free speech meant speech in accordance
with the views of the party in power was hallowed in the most saintly quar-
ters. For example, Jefferson, who had vigorously declaimed against the Sedi-
tion Act, urged state prosecutions when he became President in the belief that
they "would have a wholesome effect in restoring the integrity of the
presses." Letter From Thomas Jefferson to Thomas McKean, February 19,
1803, in 8 THE WRIrINGs OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 216, 218 (Ford ed. 1897).
Jefferson wrote the preamble to the Virginia statute of religious freedom
(1795). In it appears the following statement: "It is time enough for the
rightful purpose of civil government for its officers to interfere when prin-
ciples break out into overt acts against peace and good order .. " 2 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 546 (Boyd ed. 1950).
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national government was to be without any authority to restrict the
freedom of speech. That the final version of the amendment was
categorical and unqualified takes on additional force in the circum-
stances.
A fuller and more detailed statement of the meaning and scope
of the first amendment might well be desired. Perhaps future his-
torical research may fill the present void. This much is abundantly
clear: the express prohibition in the first amendment did not vest
or create in the national government a power, previously non-
existent, to abridge in any respect the freedom of speech or press.
Both before and after the enactment of the first amendment Congress
was without power to deal with speech. This, in brief, substantially
represents the views of Madison, Hamilton and Wilson as of the
time when the Constitution was under consideration and when the
first amendment was debated and ratified.
Whatever gaps there were in Madison's comments on the first
amendment at, or shortly before, the time of its enactment, he closed
within the following decade. Congress, less than seven years after
the enactment of this amendment, passed the Alien and Sedition
Acts in 1798. Madison wrote a report in the following year for
the Virginia state legislature attacking the constitutionality of these
acts. In this report, he asserted that the first amendment was "a
positive denial to Congress of any power whatever on the sub-
ject." 50  The federal government, he added, was "destitute of every
authority for restraining the licentiousness"' of the press, and for
shielding itself against the libellous attacks which may be made on
those who administer it."
'52
Doubt has been raised whether Madison's views of 1799 repre-
" 4 THE DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 571 (2d ed. 1896)
[hereinafter cited as DEBATES]. Madison wrote this report condemning
the Alien and Sedition Acts in 1799. His report was adopted by the Virginia
state legislature in 1800. Madison's views, however, did not go entirely
unchallenged. The Massachusetts legislature repudiated the Virginia reso-
lutions, asserting that the freedom of speech provisions in the federal con-
stitution and in state constitutions afforded the right to "utter and publish
the truth" but only "by rational use, and not the abuse of he press." Id. at
535. On the other hand, many tracts were written in support of Madison's
view. See LEVY, op. cit. supra note 23, at 271, 283 n.23.
1 This is used in the old common law sense, distinguishing it from liberty.
"24 DEBATES 572-73. Madison was quite prepared to risk the "luxuriant
growth" of the "noxious branches" of the press for fear that "by pruning
them," we might "injure the vigor of those yielding the proper fruits." Id.
at 571. Similar views were expressed by Albert Gallatin of Pennsylvania
and John Nicholas and George Hay of Virginia in 1798 and 1799.
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sented his earlier understanding. His later views, it has been sug-
gested, represented second thoughts and "a major step in the evolu-
tion of the [prevalent] meaning of the free speech-and-press
clause.""3 First of all, there is no solid basis for that doubt. Madi-
son's silence or the brevity of his contemporaneous statements was
more than made up by his clear statement that a first amendment
was unnecessary because the national government was without any
authority whatsoever over speech and press. In those circumstances,
it made little difference on a national level what was meant by free-
dom of speech or press.54 Furthermore, the rejection of the weak-
ening suggestions proposed by Jefferson speaks plainly. It is im-
portant also to remember Madison's efforts, expressed in a proposed
amendment passed by the House, to preserve free speech from state
infringement. All this should go far in dispelling any doubts as
to Madison's views. Finally, when the occasion arose in 1799 for
a detailed exposition of his views, Madison remained consistent to
the principles which he espoused in briefer form in earlier years. It
is therefore not being over-generous to him, or unfair to historical
truth, to suggest that what he said so clearly and at such length in
1799, he also meant in 1791. But even if doubts about the con-
sistency of his interpretation are warranted, his 1799 statements
should be entitled to extraordinary weight.5 Certainly no man
knew better than Madison what the first amendment meant or ought
to mean. And even if his views of 1799 represented an "evolution
of the meaning of free speech-and-press clause," who has a better
" LEvY, op. cit. supra note 23, at 282. It would seem that Professor Levy
gave too much weight to Madison's silence in the Virginia ratifying con-
vention of 1788, when Nicholas, one of Madison's firmest supporters, gave a
restricted definition of freedom of press. Madison's duty to speak on that
occasion does not seem so compelling as Professor Levy contends.
" According to contemporary tracts, the framers of the first amendment
intended that all citizens should have the same right of free speech that mem-
bers of Congress themselves have. Members of Congress were but agents
of the people, and agents should not be allowed to abridge the freedoms of
their principals. See LEVY, op. cit. supra note 23, at 271-72.
"Cf. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878): "Coming as
this does from an acknowledged leader [Jefferson] of the advocates of the
measure [freedom of religion], it may be accepted almost as an authoritative
declaration of the scope and effect of the amendment thus secured. Con-
gress was deprived of all legislative power over mere opinion, but was left
free to reach actions which were in violation of social duties or subversive
of good order." (Emphasis added.)
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claim to be heard on these matters than he-the most influential of
all the framers ?
Answering Justice Frankfurter's question-if Madison's views
are crucial for an understanding of the meaning and scope of the
free speech-and-press clause of the first amendment, we may properly
conclude that the clause is a categorical, unqualified prohibition on
Congress. But the eminent Justice, after posing the question, and
without disclosing the details or the nature of his examination,
formulated the following conclusion: "Free speech is subject to
prohibition of those abuses of expression which a civilized society
may forbid." '57 This conclusion might have followed had the first
amendment contained a provision, such as appeared in the Pennsyl-
vania constitution in 1790, which held individuals "responsible for
the abuses of that liberty,"58 but that mandate for regulation by the
states was denied to Congress. In the Justice's opinion we again
observe the confusion between the respective roles reserved to Con-
gress and the states in the area of free speech. The pronouncement
is not markedly different in substance from that suggested by
Jefferson to Madison and which was, as we have seen, rejected by
Madison and framers of the amendment. 9 If Madison's thoughts on
this matter are important, as Justice Frankfurter suggests, the con-
clusion of the eminent Justice is not warranted. It does violence to
Madison's thinking, and it was this misapprehension which gen-
erated the following proposition from Justice Frankfurter:
The demands of free speech in a democratic society as well
as the interest in national security are better served by candid
and informed weighing of the competing interests, within
the confines of the judicial process, than by announcing dog-
mas too inflexible for the non-Euclidian problems to be
solved.60
Adjustment and accommodation between liberty and authority
are an age-old problem. To this dichotomy democratic societies are a
0 However, other Federalist members of the Convention, though not
framers themselves, thought otherwise about the Sedition Acts of 1798.
"' Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 523 (1951) (concurring
opinion).
"PA. CoNsT. art. 9, § 7 (1790), in H.R. Doc. No. 357, 59th Cong., 2d
Sess. 3100 (1909).
" See note 49 supra.
0 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 524-25 (1951) (concurring
opinion). See also FREUND, op. cit. supra note 22, at 27-28.
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prey. But the suggestion that the free-speech clause of the first
amendment demands the "weighing of the competing interests"
runs counter to Madison's clear statement that the amendment
"meant a positive denial to Congress of any power whatever on"
speech."
The founding fathers understood well that they were writing a
charter for the future. They understood the need for flexibility in
dealing with changing conditions, changing attitudes, and changing
times. They must be assumed to have realized that dangers and
dilemmas would abound in all spheres of a growing nation. They
knew that certain matters were best left to the judgment of courts,
impartially and honestly weighing relevant considerations. There-
fore, they did not specify in detail what, for example, an unreason-
able search or seizure was or what constituted excessive, oppressive
bail. That duty was given to the judiciary to determine in each
specific case. Neither did the founding fathers define precisely the
scope of due process of law-that "delicate process of adjustment in-
escapably involving the exercise of judgment by those whom the
Constitution entrusted with the unfolding of the process."" The
exercise of such judgment is probably the most subtle and difficult
of all judicial mandates. But the founding fathers also knew that
there were certain rights and privileges that were sacred and in-
dispensable for the survival of representative government and a dem-
ocratic society. These revered rights were deliberately withdrawn
from the area of accommodation to the viscissitudes of future events.
This is what Congress did in its first session when it proposed the
first and fifth amendments. These amendments, specific and cate-
gorical in their prohibition,6 3 took from both the judiciary and the
legislature the delicate task of weighing, balancing and choosing from
conflicting individual and social interests.64
"14 DEBATES 571.
"Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 163
(1951).
63See HAND, BILL OF RIGHTS 57 (1958).
" Although Justice Jackson did not generally join Justices Black and
Douglas in the so-called "literal" interpretation of the free-speech clause of
the first amendment, he said: "The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to
withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to
place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them
as legal principles to be applied by the courts." West Virginia State Bd. of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943). In Robertson v. Baldwin, 165
U.S. 275, 281 (1897) (holding valid forced seaman's service against a
thirteenth amendment challenge), Justice Brown said: "The law is perfectly
1962]
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As to the fifth amendment, the Court concluded that when the
framers of the Bill of Rights enacted the unconditional privilege
against self-incrimination they had balanced the interests of the
individual against those of society in protecting itself from the
consequences of growing criminality. The weighing of one set of
interests against another was taken out of the hands of Congress
and the judiciary. As stated in the dissenting opinion in Brown v.
Walker,"5 the privilege is the "'result of the long struggle between
the opposing forces of the spirit of individual liberty on the one hand
and the collective power of the State on the other.'" What applies
to the fifth amendment applies with at least as much force to the
first. The free speech clause of the first amendment is a "specific
pledge ... implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. . . ."" There-
fore, when Justice Frankfurter says of the first amendment, that
the "primary responsibility for adjusting the interests which compete
in the situation before us [the Court] of necessity belongs to the
well settled that the first ten amendments to the Constitution, commonly
known as the Bill of Rights, were not intended to lay down any novel
principles of government, but simply to embody certain guaranties and im-
munities which we had inherited from our English ancestors, and which had
from time immemorial been subject to certain well-recognized exceptions
arising from the necessities of the case. In incorporating these principles
into the fundamental law there was no intention of disregarding the excep-
tions, which continued to be recognized as if they had been formally ex-
pressed." This was quoted with approval by Justice Frankfurter in Dennis
v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 524 (1951) (concurring opinion). Justice
Frankfurter continued: "That this represents the authentic view of the
Bill of Rights and the spirit in which it must be construed has been recog-
nized again and again in cases that have come here within the last fifty
years." Ibid. That there was no settled law respecting free speech is evi-
denced by the uncertainty whether the truth was a defense to libel, whether
court or jury was empowered to decide on the libelous character of state-
ments, or whether unworthy motive was a necessary element in libel. After
pointing out the essential differences between the British and American forms
of government, Madison said: "The state of the press ... under the common-
law cannot ... be the standard of its freedom in the United States." 4
DEBATES 569-70. But even if there had been no uncertainty as to the
nature of the guaranties or immunities attending free speech, it does not
follow that the framers did not wish to go forward and enlarge the
guaranties and privileges. In place of this welter of uncertainty, the framers
sought to declare a clear principle. This fact is entirely consistent with
constitutional or statutory provisions that the common law of England before
the American Revolution was applicable "unless inconsistent with or repug-
nant to some other constitutional or statutory provision." See LEvY, LEGACY
OF SUPPRESSION 190 (1960).
'=161 U.S. 591, 637 (1896).
66 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1937).
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Congress," 7 does that square with the decision of the founding
fathers? They weighed the competing interests. They decided.
They did not expect Congress or the courts to weigh these interests
again. The Constitution had already spoken.6"
When judges speak of adjusting competing interests, they are
speaking as though the first amendment expressly provided that
"Congress shall enact no law .. . unreasonably abridging the free-
dom of speech"; or that "Congress shall enact no law ... abridging
the freedom of speech, unless it threatens the peace, security, or
morals"; or that "Congress shall enact no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech, unless such speech is without any social utility or,
unless it encroaches upon the limited area of more important in-
terests." Had that been the text of the first amendment, the bal-
ancing of and choosing from conflicting and competing interests
might well be justified,69 and the tests laid down by a distinguished
constitutional authority might then very appropriately have been
invoked--"the relative seriousness of the danger in comparison with
the value of the occasion for speech or political activity; the avail-
ability of more moderate controls than those which the state has
imposed. . .. ""
Should Congress seek in the interest of dealing with a national
crime wave to abridge the privilege against compulsory self-incrim-
ination, the Court would not in its review consider whether or not
Congress was reasonably justified. The Court would not weigh
"the relative seriousness of the danger" to the community from a
growing crime wave "in comparison with the value of the occasion
for" silence. 1 The only question before the Court would be whether
' Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 525 (1951) (concurring
opinion).
" "An omission at the time of enactment, whether careless or calculated,
cannot be judicially supplied however much later wisdom may recommend the
inclusion." FRANKFURTER, OF LAW AND MEN 54 (1955).
" FREUND, op. cit. supra note 23, at 27, quoted with approval by Justice
Frankfurter in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 542-43 (1951) (con-
curring opinion). See also HAND, op. cit. supra note 63, at 60. Judge
Hand put a similar thought in the following language: "In each case
'Courts' must ask whether the gravity of the evil, discounted by its im-
probability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid
the danger?" Dennis v. United States, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950).
"o FREUND, op. cit. supra note 23, at 27.
" On the other hand, the provision in the fifth amendment relating to
"infamous crimes" presents quite a different problem. "The prohibition con-
tained in the Fifth Amendment refers to infamous crimes-a term obviously
inviting interpretation in harmony with conditions and opinion prevailing
1962]
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the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination was impaired-
nothing more, because there is an unconditional guarantee of that
privilege.
72
Within the constitutional framework, the prohibition against
abridgement of free-speech is as unconditional as is the guarantee of
the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. Individual and
social interests may conflict, and sacrifices may be involved in safe-
guarding the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination as well
as in the guarantee of free-speech. Why then should the constitu-
tional guarantee of free-speech "suffer subordination or deletion" ?73
The first amendment, as we have urged, is a categorical pro-
hibition on Congress. One may properly ask whether Congress
is absolutely forbidden to legislate in any fashion with respect to
speech. But speech is not a fixed, static entity or event. It may
on occasion take on an additional ingredient or factor-namely,
action charged with illegality. A copper wire, for example, is harm-
less, but a copper wire charged with electric current may be fatal.
Similarly, when speech generates such massive energy as to effect a
fusion with illegal action, then it is no longer simply "free speech";
it has become a complex of speech and illegal action. In those cir-
cumstances it is reasonable to suggest that the constitutional prohibi-
tion on Congress addressed to speech alone may no longer be appli-
cable, and Congress may reach the speech through its enumerated
powers over actions. As Judge Hand stated: "[T]here may be so
close a causal sequence between the belief engendered [by speech]
and the unlawful conduct as to toll the privilege."74 Whether that
sequence be denominated "clear-and-present danger," "triggers of
action," "fighting words," or high probability of unlawful action is
from time to time." United States v. Moreland, 258 U.S. 433, 451 (1922)(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
"Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 428 (1956). A question has
been raised as to the soundness of the decision of the Court in Ullnann.
See Brandwen, Reflections on Ulnmann v. United States, 57 COLUM. L. Rnv.
500 (1957). But it must be conceded that the Court upheld the immunity
statute in that case under the firm belief that the statute afforded the accused
full protection, even though the minority disagreed. Had the sanctity of
the privilege been abridged in any way, it is quite clear that the majority
of the Court would have held the statute unconstitutional. "If liberty is
worth keeping and free representative government worth saving, we must
stand for aU American fundamentals. . . ." Beveridge, The Assaidt upon
American Fundanmntals, 45 A.B.A. Rm'. 188, 216 (1920).
" "They made a judgment and expressed it in our fundamental law ......
Maffie v. United States, 209 F.2d 225, 227 (1st Cir. 1954).
" HAND, op. cit. supra note 63, at 57.
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relatively unimportant. What is important is to determine when the
line between speech and sequential illegal action becomes so thin as to
permit congressional intervention. This is the agonizing inquiry
which still confronts the judiciary. But it is a more limited and spe-
cific inquiry. It is addressed to particularized speech on a particular
occasion and its causal proximity to unlawful action. That is a
radically different judicial inquiry from one directed to weighing
competing interests. That the same results may be achieved in any
given instance should not obscure the importance of the method of
analysis which courts follow.
If constitutional protection of free speech in a particular instance
is denied by the federal courts, that denial should not spring from
a weighing of competing values. That denial is justified only when,
as Justice Douglas phrased it, speech has become "so closely brigaded
with illegal action as to be an inseparable part of it." ' 5
There are those who sincerely believe that the requirements of
national security and protection of the morals of the community,
particularly those of young people, demand a limitation on speech
that goes beyond that of the "speech-illegal action" exception. Even
though that plea may be just, they need to be reminded of Justice
Cardozo's admonition: "We do not pause to consider whether
a statute differently conceived and framed would yield results more
consonant with fairness and reason. We take the statute as we find
it.",70
Public policy may not be confounded with constitutionality. Ex-
ceptions should not be created, however sincere the belief that there
ought to be exceptions. In setting up exceptions, the majority of
the Court has let the serpent loose in Eden.
If, however, the consequences of abuses are too alarming to
society, then the alternative is constitutional amendment, not judicial
or congressional whittling down. If the first amendment is out-
moded and no longer conforms to modern insights, tastes and mores,
and if the needs of society must be liberated from the thraldom of
the words of the framers of the first amendment, then let the consti-
tutional method of amendment be observed. It may well be, as
" Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 514 (1957) (dissenting opinion).
" Anderson v. Wilson, 289 U.S. 20, 27 (1933). See also Polish Nat'l
Alliance v. NLRB, 322 U.S. 643, 650-51 (1944); Maffie v. United States,
209 F.2d 225, 227 (1st Cir. 1954); FRANKFURTER, op. cit. supra note 68, at
47.
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Justice Frankfurter suggests, that free speech should be "subject
to prohibition of those abuses of expression which a civilized society
may forbid." Perhaps a first amendment phrased in that manner
might have served the needs of our society better than the language
of the present amendment. But the Court may not engage in the
task of framing amendments. Moreover, it may be thought desirable
to define the respective roles of state and federal government in this
sensitive area. Should standards for political heresy and "ob-
scenity" be identical? These are perplexing problems requiring the
talents of a Madison, a Hamilton, and a Wilson. Meanwhile, let
the first amendment be immune from encroachment.
The eloquent plea for the preservation of constitutional privileges
voiced by Justice Bradley for a unanimous Court more than seventy
years ago, still retains its full validity:
[I]llegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first
footing . . . by silent approaches and slight deviations from
the legal modes of procedure .... It is the duty of courts to
be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and
against any stealthy encroachment thereon.
7
The long-ranging issue of freedom of speech has been described
as the conflict between the interest of the individual and that of
society. That is but a half-truth. Freedom of speech is no less
important to society than it is to the individual. Some of the most
glorious manifestations of man's intellect and imagination have
been dedicated to the furtherance of free-speech and its role in the
march of civilization. There can be no living representative govern-
ment, no growing democratic society, without the preservation of
free-speech with the widest possible limits. A society may flourish
and wisely manage its human affairs only if thought and inquiry are
free and expression of opinion is unfettered. In no other way will
error be confounded, judgment be balanced, and enlightenment be
achieved. Coercion and jail will not destroy error. They will
neither cure injustice nor convince the truth seekers. Those are
but a scattering of the reasons for giving the widest practicable
meaning and scope to the concept of freedom of speech.
"' Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886).
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